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ASSORTMENT OPTIMISATION UNDER A GENERAL DISCRETE
CHOICE MODEL: A TIGHT ANALYSIS OF REVENUE-ORDERED
ASSORTMENTS
GERARDO BERBEGLIA AND GWENAE¨L JORET
Abstract. The assortment problem in revenue management is the problem of deciding which
subset of products to offer to consumers in order to maximise revenue. A simple and natural
strategy is to select the best assortment out of all those that are constructed by fixing a
threshold revenue pi and then choosing all products with revenue at least pi. This is known
as the revenue-ordered assortments strategy. In this paper we study the approximation guar-
antees provided by revenue-ordered assortments when customers are rational in the following
sense: the probability of selecting a specific product from the set being offered cannot in-
crease if the set is enlarged. This rationality assumption, known as regularity, is satisfied by
almost all discrete choice models considered in the revenue management and choice theory
literature, and in particular by random utility models. The bounds we obtain are tight and
improve on recent results in that direction, such as for the Mixed Multinomial Logit model
by Rusmevichientong et al. [42]. An appealing feature of our analysis is its simplicity, as it
relies only on the regularity condition.
We also draw a connection between assortment optimisation and two pricing problems
called unit demand envy-free pricing and Stackelberg minimum spanning tree: These problems
can be restated as assortment problems under discrete choice models satisfying the regularity
condition, and moreover revenue-ordered assortments correspond then to the well-studied
uniform pricing heuristic. When specialised to that setting, the general bounds we establish
for revenue-ordered assortments match and unify the best known results on uniform pricing.
1. Introduction
Revenue management consists of a set of methodologies permitting firms to decide on the
availability and the price of their products and services. The development of this field began
in the late 1970’s in the airline industry, and has since been expanding constantly its prac-
tices into a large variety of markets such as grocery stores, retailing, railways, car rentals,
accommodation, cruises, and more recently, electronic goods [45].
At the core of revenue management lies the assortment problem, that of choosing an optimal
subset of products/services to offer to consumers in order to maximise the firm’s profits. As an
illustration, consider the case of a grocery store that has limited space for its coffee products.
Say it has space for at most 15 different coffee products on the shelves but can choose between
300 products from its distributors (due to the combinations of coffee brands, coffee types,
package sizes, etc). Given products’ costs and consumer demand, what is the best subset to
offer?
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In order to solve the assortment problem, it is necessary to know (or at least be able to
approximate) the consumer demand for each product, as a function of the assortment of
products that are offered. This issue has been widely studied in discrete choice theory, a field
which essentially tries to predict the choices of individuals when they select a product from
a finite set of mutually exclusive alternatives, typically known as the choice set. Classical
economic theory postulates that individuals select an alternative by assigning a real number
known as utility to each option and then choosing the alternative from the choice set that has
the maximum utility. Individuals are thus said to be utility maximisers. Different assumptions
about the distribution of the product utilities give rise to different discrete choice models.
Prominent examples are the multinomial logit model (MNL model) [29] and the more general
Mixed MNL model [42].
There is a large literature on studies and methodologies for solving the assortment problem
under different discrete choice models such as the independent demand model, the MNL model
[44], and Mixed MNL model [42]. A well-known heuristic is the revenue-ordered assortments
strategy. It consists in selecting the best assortment out of all those that are constructed
by fixing a threshold π and then selecting all products whose revenue is at least π. This
strategy is appealing for two reasons. First, it only needs to evaluate as many assortments
as there are different revenues among products, independently of the number of products the
firm offers. Second, even if one has no knowledge about consumer choice behaviour, revenue-
ordered assortments can still be used, one only needs to be able to evaluate the revenue of
these revenue-ordered assortments. This second point is important in practice since most of
the time not only the parameters of the assumed discrete choice model are not known but
also it is not known what type of discrete choice model the consumers are following (e.g. MNL
model, Nested MNL model, etc.). This motivates the study of the performance of revenue-
ordered assortments under different discrete choice models. Talluri and Van Ryzin [44] showed
for instance that, when consumers follow the MNL model, the revenue-ordered assortments
strategy is in fact optimal. In general however, this strategy does not always produce an
optimal solution to the assortment problem.
1.1. Contributions. Our first contribution is an analysis of the performance of the revenue-
ordered assortments strategy making only minimal assumptions about the underlying discrete
choice model: We assume that consumers behave rationally, in the sense that the probability
of choosing a specific product x ∈ S when given a choice set S cannot increase if S is enlarged.
This rationality assumption, known as regularity, is satisfied by almost all models studied in
the revenue management and choice theory literature. This includes in particular all random
utility models, as well as other models introduced recently such as the additive perturbed
utility model, the hitting fuzzy attention model, and models obtained using a non-additive
random utility function (see Section 4 for a discussion of these models). We provide three
types of revenue guarantees for revenue-ordered assortments: If there are k distinct revenues
r1, r2, . . . , rk associated with the products (listed in increasing order), then revenue-ordered
assortments approximate the optimum revenue to within a factor of
(A) 1/k;
(B) 1/(1 + ln(rk/r1)), and
(C) 1/(1 + ln ν),
where ν is defined with respect to an optimal assortment S∗ as the ratio between the probabil-
ity of just buying a product and that of buying a product with highest revenue in S∗. These
ASSORTMENT OPTIMISATION UNDER A GENERAL DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL 3
three guarantees are in general incomparable, that is, (A), (B), or (C) can be the largest
depending on the instance.
When applied to the special case of Mixed MNL models, bound (B) improves the recent
analysis of revenue-ordered assortments by Rusmevichientong et al. [42], who showed a bound
of 1/(e(1 + ln(rk/r1))). Our results also provide the first revenue guarantees for a tractable
approach to solving the assortment problem under some recent discrete choice models that lie
beyond the random utility model. In particular, in Section 4.4 we briefly describe the Additive
Perturbed Utility Model [23]; the Hitting Fuzzy Attention Model [3], and a model proposed
by McClellon et al. [33] based on a capacity function. Since these three models satisfy the
regularity property, our revenue guarantees for the revenue-ordered assortment strategy hold.
After finishing a preliminary version of this paper, we learned of independent results by Aouad
et al. [7] on the approximation guarantees of revenue-ordered assortments. In the important
case of random utility models, they showed a bound of Ω(1/ln(rk/r1)), which is thus within a
constant factor of our bound (B). (In fact, one can deduce a bound of 2/(5⌈ln(rk/r1)⌉) from
their proof.) They also proved a bound of Ω(1/ln λ˜), where λ˜ is the probability of buying a
product when offered the set consisting of only the products with highest revenue. This is
closely related to bound (C) above, as it can be shown that ν 6 λ˜.
Complementing our analysis, we show that the three bounds (A), (B), and (C) are exactly
tight, in the sense that none of the bounds remains true if multiplied by a factor (1+ǫ) for any
ǫ > 0. Let us remark that bounds (A) and (B) also provide a quick and easy way to obtain some
upper bound on the optimum revenue that can be achieved on a given instance, by simply
checking the revenue provided by revenue-ordered assortments. While the resulting upper
bounds can of course be far from the optimum, they have the merit of being straightforward
to compute, independently of how complex the underlying discrete choice model is, as long as
it satisfies the regularity condition. Bound (C) on the other hand is typically hard to compute
exactly as it involves knowing an optimal solution; nevertheless, some non-trivial bounds that
are easy to compute can be deduced from (C) by bounding ν from above (using the bound
ν 6 λ˜ mentioned above for instance).
Our second contribution is to draw a connection between assortment optimisation and some
pricing problems studied in the theoretical computer science literature by showing that these
pricing problems can be restated as an assortment problem under a discrete choice model
satisfying the above-mentioned rationality assumption. This includes unit demand envy-free
pricing problems and the Stackelberg minimum spanning tree problem. Unlike the assortment
problem, these problems consist not in selecting a subset of products (that have an attached
price) to offer to consumers, but rather to assign a price to each product (see Section 4 for
definitions). The best known approximation algorithm for these problems consists in assigning
the same (well-chosen) price to all the products, and is called uniform pricing. We will show
that these pricing problems can be seen as special cases of the assortment problem under a
regular discrete choice model, and prove that the revenue-ordered assortment strategy applied
to these special cases is equivalent to applying the uniform pricing algorithm to these pricing
problems.
We conclude the paper with a brief analysis of the single-leg multi-period setting with limited
capacity as studied by Talluri and Van Ryzin [44]. In this problem the seller has Q units to sell
over a finite time horizon T . Rusmevichientong et al. [42] showed that when the seller restricts
to offer revenue-ordered assortments and consumers follow a Mixed MNL choice model: (i) the
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offer set gets larger (or stays the same) as the number of time periods remaining increases, and
(ii) the offer set gets smaller (or stays the same) as the number of available units remaining
decreases. We observe that these two monotonicity results hold more generally for the discrete
choice models considered in this paper. As mentioned by Rusmevichientong et al. [42], these
results could potentially be used in the implementation of standard revenue management
systems.
1.2. Related literature. The assortment problem is an active research topic in revenue
management, and providing an exhaustive literature review is beyond the scope of this paper.
In this section, we focus mostly on previous works that are directly related to our contributions.
One of the first studies of the assortment problem for a general discrete choice model was
carried out by Talluri and Van Ryzin [44]. In that paper, the authors considered a single-leg
seat allocation problem in which a firm sells aircraft seats to consumers arriving one at a
time. Each consumer selects at most one fare among the ones that are offered, and the firm
has to decide the subset of fares to offer at each time period, depending on the number of
available seats and time periods remaining. The authors have shown that this problem reduces
to solving a static (or single shot) assortment problem in which one wishes to maximise the
expected profit on a single consumer without caring about capacity. For the special case in
which the consumer choice model is the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, they proved that the
optimal choice sets are revenue-ordered assortments. Thus, solving the assortment problem
when consumers follow a MNL model can be done efficiently in polynomial time. Again under
the MNL model, Rusmevichientong et al. [41] studied the assortment problem subject to the
constraint that there is maximum number of products that can be shown in the assortment.
Although the assortment sometimes fails to be a revenue-ordered assortment, the authors
proved than an optimal assortment can still be found in polynomial-time. Another extension of
the assortment problem over MNL model was considered by Rusmevichientong and Topaloglu
[39] where the authors formulated the problem as a robust optimization problem in which
the true parameters are unknown. Recently, Feldman et al. [21] ran a large field experiment
on the online platform Alibaba and reported that using an MNL choice model to optimise
assortments provides higher revenues than a machine learning method that is currently being
used on Alibaba.
Another series of papers studied the assortment problem in which different shares of customers
follow different MNL models, a model known as the Mixed MNL model. The assortment prob-
lem under a Mixed MNL model is NP-hard [13]. A branch-and-cut algorithm was presented
by Me´ndez-Dı´az et al. [35], and computational methods to obtain good upper bounds on
the optimal revenue were given in Feldman and Topaloglu [20]. Rusmevichientong et al. [42]
proved that the problem remains NP-hard even when the model is composed of only two cus-
tomer types. The authors also studied the performance of revenue-ordered assortments in this
setting, and proved in particular an approximation ratio of 1/(e(1+ ln(rk/r1))), as mentioned
earlier.
Blanchet et al. [10] introduced a new discrete choice model where consumers preferences
are built using a Markov chain in which states correspond to products. They showed that
the assortment problem under this discrete choice model can be solved in polynomial time.
Feldman and Topaloglu [22] extended their results to the case of a single-leg seat allocation
problem over a finite time horizon when consumers follow the Markov chain model. De´sir
et al. [17] proved that the assortment problem with a capacity constraint in the Markov chain
model is APX-hard and provide a polynomial-time constant-factor approximation algorithm.
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Recently, Berbeglia [9] showed that every choice model based on Markov chains models belongs
to the class of choice models based on random utility. Jagabathula [25] introduced a local
search heuristic for the assortment problem under an arbitrary discrete choice model. The
author proved that the heuristic is optimal in the case of the MNL model, and remains so even
if the choice set is subject to a maximum cardinality constraint. Aouad et al. [6] study the
assortment problem under a family of choices models known as consider-then-chose models
that have been empirically tested in the marketing literature. The authors provided several
computational complexity results as well as a dynamic programming algorithm that can be
used by heuristics for arbitrary choice models based on random utility. Recently, there has
been progress in studying choice models that incorporate position biases, i.e. models where
consumers choices are affected by the specific positions or configurations in which the products
are offered [1, 5, 16].
The strongest negative result to date regarding the computational complexity of the assort-
ment problem is due to Aouad et al. [7]. They proved that the assortment problem under
a random utility model is NP-hard to approximate to within a factor of Ω(1/n1−ǫ) where n
denotes the number of products, and to within a factor of Ω(1/log1−ǫ(rk/r1)), for every ǫ > 0.
Note that the first result implies in particular the hardness of achieving an approximation
ratio of Ω(1/k1−ǫ), since n > k. Comparing this with approximation guarantees (A) and
(B) for revenue-ordered assortments, we thus see that the latter heuristic achieves essentially
the best possible approximation ratios (w.r.t. these parameters) among all computationally
efficient strategies. We note that revenue guarantees that are functions of other parameters
of the model were given by Aouad et al. [7] in the case of random utility models.
Another line of research related to our work is the study of envy-free pricing problems. Envy-
free pricing problems were introduced by Rusmevichientong [38] (see section 4.5 for the defini-
tion). Aggarwal et al. [2] and Guruswami et al. [24] analysed some natural pricing algorithms,
while Briest and Krysta [12] and Chalermsook et al. [15] proved inapproximability results
which show essentially that these simple algorithms are probably the best one can hope for
among those that are computationally efficient (i.e. that run in polynomial time). Envy-free
pricing will be the focus of Section 4.5. As mentioned in Section 1.1, we will show that some of
these problems can be seen as special cases of the assortment problem under a regular discrete
choice model, thus connecting the envy-free pricing literature with the operations research
area of revenue management.
2. The assortment problem
Think of each alternative (or choice) in C = {1, . . . , N} as products types of a firm that are
available to sell to consumers. Faced with a choice set S ⊆ C, consumers choose their most
preferred product out of the set S, or simply choose not to purchase at all. Since consumers
may have heterogeneous preferences, we let P(x, S) denote the probability that a consumer
will choose product x when faced with a choice set S ⊆ C. (Defining choices as probabilities
is also required to account for choice functions with a stochastic component, even in the case
consumers have homogeneous (stochastic) preferences.) Following Talluri and Van Ryzin [44]
we let x = 0 denote the no-purchase option. Therefore, P(0, S) = 1 −
∑
x∈S P(x, S). A
regular discrete choice model is characterised by the function P (called the system of choice
probabilities) defined over the domain I = {(x, S) : S ⊆ C, x ∈ S ∪ {0}}, and satisfies the
following four axioms:
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(i) P(x, S) > 0 for every x ∈ C ∪ {0} and S ⊆ C;
(ii) P(x, S) = 0 for every x ∈ C and S ⊆ C \ {x};
(iii)
∑
x∈S P(x, S) 6 1 for every S ⊆ C.
(iv) P(x, S) > P(x, S′) for every S ⊆ S′ ⊆ C and x ∈ S ∪ {0}.
Inequality (i) states that probabilities must be non negative. Equality (ii) captures the fact
that consumers cannot choose a product which is not offered. Inequality (iii) specifies that
consumers can choose at most one product from the choice set. Finally, inequality (iv) ensures
that the probability of choosing a specific product does not increase when the choice set is
enlarged. This last axiom is called the regularity axiom.
Note that axioms (i)–(iii) are satisfied by any discrete choice model. As we will see, the
regularity axiom (axiom (iv)) is satisfied by almost all models studied in revenue management,
economics, and psychology, and in particular by the well-known random utility models (RUM);
see Section 4. We remark that there nevertheless exist discrete choice models for which the
regularity axiom fails to hold, this is the case for instance for a perception-based model [19]
and the pairwise choice markov chain model [37].
We now proceed with the definition of the assortment problem. Consider a regular discrete
choice model with system of choice probabilities P, and let r : C → R>0 be a revenue function
associating to each element of C a positive (per unit) revenue or price. (In this paper costs
are assumed to be negligible and therefore the words ‘revenue’ and (selling) ‘price’ are used
interchangeably.)
Definition 1. For each set S ⊆ C, the seller’s revenue when offering set S is∑
x∈S
P(x, S)r(x).
The assortment problem consists in finding a subset S of the products in C so that the cor-
responding revenue is maximised. We let OPT denote the maximum revenue that can be
achieved.
One may thus see the assortment problem as that of finding the best choice set S maximising
the expected utility. It can be shown that, under reasonable assumptions on how the system
of choice probabilities P is provided in input, the assortment problem is NP-hard. In fact, it
remains NP-hard even in some very restricted cases such as when the discrete choice model is
a mixture of only two multinomial logit models [42].
We end this section with a straightforward but important observation about regular discrete
choice models, namely that the probability of making a purchase does not decrease when the
choice set is enlarged.
Lemma 2.1. If P denotes the system of choice probabilities of a regular discrete choice model,
then ∑
x∈S
P(x, S) 6
∑
x∈S′
P(x, S′)
for every S ⊆ S′ ⊆ C.
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Proof. Let S ⊆ S′ ⊆ C. We have∑
x∈S
P(x, S) + P(0, S) =
∑
x∈S′
P(x, S′) + P(0, S′) = 1
by definition of P(0, S) and axiom (iii), and thus∑
x∈S
P(x, S) −
∑
x∈S′
P(x, S′) = P(0, S′)− P(0, S) 6 0,
by the regularity axiom (iv), implying
∑
x∈S P(x, S) 6
∑
x∈S′ P(x, S
′). 
3. Performance guarantees of revenue-ordered assortments
Fix a regular discrete choice model with system of choice probabilities P, a revenue function
r : C → R>0, and consider the corresponding assortment problem. Let us recall the revenue-
ordered assortments strategy to obtain a (hopefully good) solution: Let r1, r2, . . . , rk be the
distinct values taken by the revenue function r, sorted in increasing order; thus, 0 < r1 < r2 <
· · · < rk. For each i ∈ [k] let Si ⊆ C be the set consisting of all products of revenue at least
ri. Then simply compare the revenue of each of the k sets S1, . . . , Sk, and choose one with
maximum revenue.
In this section we present an analysis of the approximation guarantees of revenue-ordered
assortments. We give three lower bounds on the approximation ratio which, in general, are
incomparable. (For 0 < α 6 1, an algorithm is said to achieve an approximation ratio of α
for the assortment problem, or equivalently to approximate the problem to within a factor of
α, if the algorithm always produces a solution whose revenue is at least α · OPT.) We begin
with a simple one:
Theorem 3.1. Revenue-ordered assortments approximate the optimum revenue to within a
factor of 1
k
.
Proof. Let S∗ ⊆ C denote an optimal solution to the assortment problem. Let j ∈ [k] be the
index of a set maximising its revenue among S1, . . . , Sk; thus, the revenue provided by the
revenue-ordered assortments strategy is
∑
x∈Sj
P(x, Sj)r(x).
We begin with a technical observation about the revenue of Si (i ∈ [k]):∑
x∈Si
P(x, Si)r(x) >
∑
x∈S∗∩Si
P(x, S∗)ri. (5)
This can be proved as follows:
∑
x ∈Si
P(x, Si)r(x) >
∑
x ∈Si
P(x, Si)ri >
∑
x ∈S∗∩Si
P(x, S∗ ∩ Si)ri >
∑
x ∈S∗∩Si
P(x, S∗)ri.
Above, the second inequality follows from Lemma 2.1 and the third follows from the regularity
axiom (c.f. axiom (iv)).
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Using (5), it is straightforward to obtain the lower bound of 1/k on the approximation ratio:
OPT =
∑
x∈S∗
P(x, S∗)r(x)
=
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈S∗,
r(x)=ri
P(x, S∗)ri 6
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈S∗∩Si
P(x, S∗)ri 6
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Si
P(x, Si)r(x)6
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈Sj
P(x, Sj)r(x)
= k
∑
x∈Sj
P(x, Sj)r(x),
that is, ∑
x∈Sj
P(x, Sj)r(x) >
1
k
OPT,
as desired. (We note that the second inequality holds by (5) and the third by the definition
of the index j.) 
We continue with the second bound on the approximation ratio, which is a function of the
ratio between the highest and lowest revenues of products in C.
Theorem 3.2. Revenue-ordered assortments approximate the optimum revenue to within a
factor of
1∑k
i=1
ri−ri−1
ri
>
1
1 + ln ρ
where ρ := rk/r1 and r0 := 0.
Proof. As in the previous proof, let S∗ ⊆ C denote an optimal solution to the assortment
problem, and let j ∈ [k] be the index of a set maximising its revenue among S1, . . . , Sk. First,
we rewrite the revenue of S∗ as follows.
OPT =
∑
x∈S∗
P(x, S∗)r(x) =
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈S∗,
r(x)=ri
P(x, S∗)ri.
Rearranging the terms in the last expression, we obtain:
OPT =
k∑
ℓ=1
(rℓ − rℓ−1)
k∑
i=ℓ
∑
x∈S∗,
r(x)=ri
P(x, S∗) =
k∑
ℓ=1
(rℓ − rℓ−1)
∑
x∈S∗∩Sℓ
P(x, S∗)
=
k∑
ℓ=1
rℓ − rℓ−1
rℓ
∑
x∈S∗∩Sℓ
P(x, S∗)rℓ 6
k∑
ℓ=1
rℓ − rℓ−1
rℓ
∑
x∈Sℓ
P(x, Sℓ)r(x)
6 (1 + ln ρ)
∑
x∈Sj
P(x, Sj)r(x),
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as desired. Here, the first inequality holds by (5) (c.f. proof of Theorem 3.1), and the second
one follows from the observation that
k∑
ℓ=1
rℓ − rℓ−1
rℓ
= 1 +
k∑
ℓ=2
rℓ − rℓ−1
rℓ
6 1 +
∫ rk
r1
dt
t
= 1 + ln(rk/r1).

Next we bound the approximation ratio using a technical quantity which is a function of an
optimal solution. We will see concrete applications of this bound later on.
Theorem 3.3. Let S∗ ⊆ C denote an optimal solution, and let
Ni :=
∑
x∈S∗,
r(x)>ri
P(x, S∗)
for each i ∈ [k]. Suppose that N1 > 0, and let ℓ ∈ [k] be maximum such that Nℓ > 0. Then
revenue-ordered assortments approximate the optimum revenue to within a factor of
1∑ℓ
i=1
Ni−Ni+1
Ni
>
1
(1 + ln ν)
,
where ν := N1/Nℓ.
Proof. Let j ∈ [k] be the index of a set Si maximising its revenue among S1, . . . , Sk. Observe
that Ni 6
∑
x∈Si
P(x, Si) for every i ∈ [k], and thus Niri 6
∑
x∈Si
P(x, Si)ri for every i. It
follows
Niri 6
∑
x∈Sj
P(x, Sj)r(x) (6)
for every i ∈ [k], that is, the revenue resulting from the revenue-ordered assortments strategy
is at least max16i6kNiri.
The revenue of S∗ can be expressed as follows:
∑
x ∈S∗
P(x, S∗)r(x) =
k∑
i=1
∑
x∈S∗,
r(x)=ri
P(x, S∗)ri =
ℓ∑
i=1
∑
x∈S∗,
r(x)=ri
P(x, S∗)ri
=
ℓ∑
i=1
(Ni −Ni+1)ri =
ℓ∑
i=1
Ni −Ni+1
Ni
Niri
where we let Nk+1 := 0 in case ℓ = k. Using (6), we then obtain:
∑
x ∈S∗
P(x, S∗)r(x) =
ℓ∑
i=1
Ni −Ni+1
Ni
Niri 6
ℓ∑
i=1
Ni −Ni+1
Ni
∑
x∈Sj
P(x, Sj)r(x)
6 (1 + ln ν)
∑
x∈Sj
P(x, Sj)r(x),
as desired. 
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Theorem 3.4. All three bounds on the approximation ratio given in this section are tight.
Proof. Let k > 1 and let C consists of N = k(k+1)2 products. To simplify the description, it will
be convenient to identify the set C of products with the set of all pairs (i, j) with i ∈ [k] and
j ∈ [i]. Next, fix some ε with 0 < ε 6 12 and let the revenue of product (i, j) be ε
−j . Thus,
defining r1, . . . , rk as before, we have ri = ε
−i for each i ∈ [k]. Finally, define the system of
choice probabilities P by letting
P((i, j), S) :=
{
εi if (i, 1), . . . , (i, j − 1) /∈ S
0 otherwise.
for each S ⊆ C and (i, j) ∈ S. Also, let P(0, S) := 1 −
∑
x∈S P(x, S) for each S ⊆ C, as
expected.
We proceed to verify that P satisfies all four axioms. Inequality (i) and equality (ii) are clearly
satisfied. For each subset S ⊆ C it holds that∑
(i,j)∈S
P((i, j), S) 6 ε1 + ε2 + . . .+ εk <
1
1− ε
− 1 =
ε
1− ε
6 1,
so inequality (iii) is also respected. To prove that the regularity axiom holds, consider a
choice set S ⊆ C, an element (i, j) ∈ S, and a choice set S′ such that S ⊆ S′ ⊆ C. Clearly,
P((i, j), S) and P((i, j), S′) can only take the values εi or 0. Moreover, it can be checked from
the definition of P that P((i, j), S) = 0 implies P((i, j), S′) = 0. Hence,
P((i, j), S) > P((i, j), S′) for every S ⊆ S′ ⊆ C and (i, j) ∈ S. (7)
For a subset S ⊆ C and index i ∈ [k], let Si = {(i, j) : j ∈ [i], (i, j) ∈ S}, thus S = ∪
k
i=1Si and
Si ∩ Si′ = ∅ for all i, i
′ ∈ [k] with i 6= i′. For sets S, S′ with S ⊆ S′ ⊆ C, we have
∑
(i,j)∈S
P((i, j), S) =
∑
i∈[k]
∑
(i,j)∈Si
P((i, j), Si) =
∑
i∈[k],Si 6=∅
εi 6
∑
i∈[k],S′i 6=∅
εi =
∑
(i,j)∈S′
P((i, j), S′).
(8)
From (8) it follows that
P(0, S) > P(0, S′) for every S ⊆ S′ ⊆ C. (9)
We deduce from (7) and (9) that the regularity axiom (iv) holds, and therefore the constructed
system of choice probabilities is a regular discrete choice model. (Alternatively, one could
verify that the proposed choice model belongs to the class of choice models based on stochastic
preferences and therefore the regularity property is inherited, see Section 4.1.)
Now, the best assortment among all k revenue-ordered assortments is the first one, namely
the one consisting of all products of revenue at least r1, that is, all products. Its revenue is
(ε+ ε2 + · · ·+ εk) · ε−1 < 11−ε . On the other hand, observe that offering the products (i, i) for
each i ∈ [k] yields a revenue of k (in fact, this is the optimal solution).
Thus, if we let ε tend to 0 then the ratio between the two values tends to k, showing that
Theorem 3.1 is best possible. Also, observe that
∑k
i=1
ri−ri−1
ri
tends to k when ε→ 0, showing
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that Theorem 3.2 is tight as well. Finally, regarding Theorem 3.3, if we define Ni (i ∈ [k])
w.r.t. the optimal solution S∗ := {(i, i) : i ∈ [k]}, we have Ni = ε
i + · · · + εk for each i ∈ [k],
and
∑k
i=1
Ni−Ni+1
Ni
also tends to k when ε→ 0. 
4. Applications
In this section we describe how the main results from Section 3 can be applied to derive
revenue guarantees of the revenue-ordered assortments for the assortment problem under a
wide range of choice models studied in revenue management as well as in the theoretical
economics literature. We highlight that often, in practice, one does not know what choice
model consumers are following. Nevertheless, as long as the firm is able to evaluate the
expected revenue obtained by each of k the choice sets Si (i = 1, . . . , k) stemming from the
revenue-ordered assortment strategy, and the (unknown) choice model satisfies regularity, the
revenue guarantees obtained in Section 3 hold. We also show that the bounds obtained in
Section 3 generalise previous results regarding the uniform pricing heuristic for some pricing
problems studied in theoretical computer science.
4.1. Random utility models. Let us first recall the definition of random utility models
first proposed by Thurstone [46]. In a random utility model, individuals assign a random
variable Ux (utility) to each product x ∈ C ∪ {0}. These N + 1 random variables are jointly
distributed over RN+1, with a probability measure Pr such that Pr(Ux = Uy) = 0 for all
distinct x, y ∈ C ∪ {0}. Given a choice set S ⊆ C, an individual considers a realisation
(u0, u1, . . . , uN ) of the random utilities and then selects x ∈ S ∪{0} such that ux is maximum
(note that this could be the no-purchase option x = 0).
Definition 2. Suppose U0, U1, . . . , UN and Pr are as above. Then the system of choice prob-
abilities P induced by this random utility model is obtained by setting
P(x, S) = Pr(Ux = max{Uy : y ∈ S ∪ {0}})
for all S ⊆ C and x ∈ S ∪ {0}.
Whenever P is as in Definition 2 we say that P is a random utility based discrete choice model,
which we abbreviate as RUM for short. We remark that if P is a RUM then it is a regular
discrete choice model; in particular, P satisfies the regularity axiom (axiom (iv)). Informally,
this is because if we consider a choice set S and a product x ∈ S ∪ {0} then the likelihood
that x maximises utility among products in S ∪ {0} can only decrease if we enlarge the set S.
This was originally observed by Luce and Suppes [30]. We thus have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.1. Every RUM is a regular discrete choice model.
The converse of Lemma 4.1 is not true. One way to observe this is that every RUM has the
following submodularity property (a proof is given in the appendix).
Lemma 4.2. In every random utility based discrete choice model, the demand function f(S) =∑
x∈S P(x, S) is submodular, i.e. f(S
′∪{x})−f(S′) 6 f(S∪{x})−f(S) for every S ⊆ S′ ⊆ C
and x ∈ C.
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On the other hand, submodularity of the demand function does not follow from axioms (i)-
(iv). This can be seen on the following simple example, adapted from McFadden and Richter
[34] (observe that f({1, 2, 3}) − f({1, 2}) = .15 > f({1, 3}) − f({1}) = .1).
S P(0, S) P(1, S) P(2, S) P(3, S)
{1} .5 .5 − −
{2} .5 − .5 −
{3} .5 − − .5
{1, 2} .4 .3 .3 −
{1, 3} .4 .3 − .3
{2, 3} .4 − .3 .3
{1, 2, 3} .25 .25 .25 .25
A consequence of Lemma 4.1 is that the revenue guarantees of revenue-ordered assortments
given by Theorems 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 hold for the assortment problem under a RUM, regardless
on how complex the RUM in question is. For example, our results apply to some recent models
in neuroscience and psychology that predict how the brain reaches a decision, see Webb [47]
and Webb et al. [48].
It is well known that a random utility based discrete choice model can also be described by
means of a probability distribution over all rankings of the elements in C ∪{0} as follows: Let
Pr be a probability measure over the set SN+1 of the (N +1)! permutations of the elements in
C ∪ {0}, often called a stochastic preference. Given a permutation ≺∈ SN+1 and two distinct
elements x, y ∈ C ∪ {0}, let us write x ≺ y whenever x appears before y in ≺.
Definition 3. Suppose Pr is as above. Then the system of choice probabilities P induced by
this stochastic preference model is obtained by setting
P(x, S) = Pr(x ≺ y for all y ∈ (S ∪ {0}) − {x}) (10)
for all S ⊆ C and x ∈ S ∪ {0}.
In other words, P(x, S) is the probability that x is ranked first among all products in S and the
no-purchase option 0. As mentioned earlier, random utility models and stochastic preference
models are essentially equivalent, in the sense that they give rise to the same class of discrete
choice models:
Theorem 4.3. A system of choice probabilities P is a RUM if and only if P is induced by
some stochastic preference model.
For a proof of Theorem 4.3 see for instance Block and Marschak [11] or Koning and Ridder
[28].
It is a simple exercise to show that the discrete choice model of the tight example proposed
in the proof of Theorem 3.4 is in fact induced by a stochastic preference model. This implies
that the three bounds presented in Section 3 are tight as well when restricted to RUMs. In
particular, they are tight for discrete choice models with submodular demand functions, since
RUMs have submodular demand functions.
ASSORTMENT OPTIMISATION UNDER A GENERAL DISCRETE CHOICE MODEL 13
4.2. Distance based models. An important class of discrete choice models that are induced
by stochastic preferences are the distance based models [36]. A distance based model is defined
by a central ranking or preference R, a scale parameter θ ∈ R+, and a distance function over
the rankings d : SN × SN → R+. Then, the probability that the individual follows a ranking
r is given by
f(r|R, θ) := C(θ) exp[−θd(r,R)],
where C(θ) is a scaling constant that is chosen so that f(r|R, θ) is a probability distribution.
The most popular class of discrete choice models of this family are the Mallows models [31],
which are characterized as those distance based models in which the distance function d(., .)
is the Kendall distance [27] (this distance function counts the pairwise disagreements between
the rankings). Mallows models have been studied profoundly in voting contexts in the ma-
chine learning and statistics literature (see, e.g. Young [49] and Diaconis [18]). Very recently,
Jagabathula and Vulcano [26] have used these models to understand and predict customer
behaviour in the context of revenue management.
A natural extension of distance based models are the models obtained by the aggregation of
multiple distance based models into a single stochastic preference. These models are known
as Mixture of Distance Based Models (see, e.g. Murphy and Martin [36] and Awasthi et al.
[8]).
To the best of our knowledge, the assortment problem has not been studied in the literature
under any distance based model. Since these models are stochastic preference models, they
can be induced by a random utility model, and hence our revenue guarantees for the revenue-
ordered assortment strategy hold under these models.
4.3. Mixed Multinomial Logit. One of the most studied discrete choice models is the
multinomial logit (MNL) model, first introduced by Luce [29]. The MNL model is a random
utility based discrete choice model in which each product x (including the no-purchase option)
has utility
Ux = vx + ǫx
where vx is a constant and all ǫx with x ∈ C are i.i.d. random variables with a Gumbel
distribution with zero mean.
Without loss of generality, we may assume that the no-purchase option 0 has a mean utility
of zero (i.e. v0 = 0). Under the MNL model, when an individual is shown a subset of products
S ⊆ C, the probability that she will choose product x ∈ S ∪ {0} is
P(x, S) =
evx
1 +
∑
y∈S e
vy
.
The Mixed Multinomial Logit model is an extension of the MNL model in which the vector
V = (v0, v1, . . . , vN ) is no longer fixed but is now a random vector in R
N+1 following some fixed
distribution. In the Mixed MNL model, when given a subset of products S, the probability
that an individual chooses product x ∈ S ∪ {0} is then
P(x, S) = E
[
evx
1 +
∑
y∈S e
vy
]
,
where the expectation is taken w.r.t. the random vector V = (v0, v1, . . . , vN ).
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Although the revenue-ordered assortments strategy is optimal under the MNL model [44], this
is no longer the case for the Mixed MNL model. In fact, [42] gave an example where the vector
V = (v0, v1, . . . , vN ) can only take two distinct values and yet the strategy is not optimal. On
the other hand, since every Mixed MNL model is also a random utility model, the guarantee
from Theorem 3.2 applies:
Corollary 4.4. The revenue-ordered assortments strategy approximates the optimum revenue
of the assortment problem under a Mixed MNL model to within a factor of 1(1+ln ρ) , where
ρ := rk/r1.
This improves the recent analysis by Rusmevichientong et al. [42] of the revenue-ordered
assortments strategy under a Mixed MNL model, who obtained an approximation factor of
1
e(1+lnρ) .
4.4. Beyond random utility models. In this section we briefly describe some discrete
choice models considered in the literature that are not random utility models but still satisfy
the regularity axiom.
Fudenberg et al. [23] proposed a choice model called Additive Perturbed Utility (APU) model,
in which consumers are endowed with an utility function u : C ∪{0} → R over the alternatives
(including the no-choice option) and a perturbation function that can reward choice randomi-
sation. Specifically, this perturbation function c : [0, 1] → R ∪ {∞} is assumed to be strictly
convex over (0, 1), and such that limq→0 c
′(q) = −∞.
For s ∈ N let F (s) := {(p0, p1, . . . , ps) ∈ R
s+1|pi > 0 for each i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , s} and
∑s
i=0 pi =
1}. Given a choice set S ⊆ C whose elements are enumerated as a1, a2, . . . , as in order w.r.t. C =
{1, 2, . . . , N} (i.e. ai < ai+1 for i < s), let p
∗(S) ∈ Rs+1 denote the point p = (p0, p1, . . . , ps) ∈
F (s) maximising
s∑
i=0
(u(ai) · pi − c(pi)).
(As expected, a0 = 0 denotes the no-choice option; also, we remark that p
∗(S) is uniquely
defined, as follows from the strict convexity of the perturbation function c.) The system of
choice probabilities P of the model is then induced by these vectors p∗(S), by letting
(P(0, S),P(a1 , S), . . . ,P(as, S)) := p
∗(S).
If the perturbation function is c(x) = α · x ln(x) with α > 0 a fixed constant, then the model
is equivalent to the Multinomial Logit model [4]. Although every APU model satisfies the
regularity axiom (Fudenberg et al. [23, Theorem 1]), it can be shown that there are APU
models that are not RUM even when there are four alternatives in the universe C (Fudenberg
et al. [23, Example 4]).
Inspired by the experimental evidence that consumers do not pay attention to all alternatives
in the choice set, Aguiar [3] has recently introduced a new choice model called the Hitting Fuzzy
Attention Model (H-FAM). Under H-FAM, the attention of the consumer to an alternative is
not binary but can lie in a continuum between being not aware at all of the alternative, to being
fully aware of it. To formally describe H-FAM we need to define a function called substitutable
attention capacity. A substitutable attention capacity is a function φ : 2C → [0, 1] that is
monotone, i.e. φ(A) 6 φ(B) for all A ⊆ B ⊆ C and submodular, i.e. φ(A ∪ {x}) − φ(A) >
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φ(B ∪ {x}) − φ(B) for all A ⊆ B ⊆ C, and x ∈ C. Intuitively, given a choice set S ⊆ C,
φ(S) represents the probability that the consumer would consider at least one alternative
from S. The H-FAM is composed of a pair (≺, φ) where ≺∈ SN is a strict preference order of
the alternatives and φ is a substitutable attention capacity. We are now ready to define the
system of choice probabilities for H-FAMs.
Suppose (≺, φ) is defined as above. Then the system of choice probabilities P induced by this
H-FAM is obtained by setting for x ∈ C,
P(x, S) :=


φ({x} ∪ {y ∈ S|y ≺ x})− φ({y ∈ S|y ≺ x}) if x ∈ S
0 otherwise
and letting P(0, S) := 1−
∑
x∈S P(x, S).
The H-FAM, which contains as a special case the recent RUM choice model based on the
bounded rationality proposed by Manzini and Mariotti [32], satisfies the regularity axiom.
Nevertheless, Aguiar [3] proved that H-FAM are not contained in RUM nor in APU.
Recently, McClellon et al. [33] proposed another way to represent choice models based on a
function f : 2SN+1 → [0, 1] such that f(∅) = 0, f(SN+1) = 1 and f(E) 6 f(F ) when E ⊆ F .
Thus, the domain of function f , known as the capacity function, is the collection of all subsets
of strict preferences among the elements in C ∪ {0}. Given a strict preference ≺∈ SN+1 and
a choice set S ⊆ C, we say that x ∈ S ∪ {0} is ≺-optimal w.r.t. S if x is preferred under ≺
among all other alternatives in S ∪ {0}.
The choice model characterized by the capacity function f is obtained by setting, for x ∈
C ∪ {0},
P(x, S) :=


f({≺∈ SN+1|x is ≺ -optimal w.r.t. S}) if x ∈ S ∪ {0}
0 otherwise.
While there exist choice models that are characterized by a capacity function f but are not
RUM, it can be shown that they all satisfy the regularity axiom. In fact, one of the main
results of McClellon et al. [33] is that a discrete choice model is regular if and only if it can
be characterized by a capacity function f .
To the best of our knowledge, the assortment problem has not been studied in the literature
under any of these models. Since all these models satisfy the regularity axiom, our revenue
guarantees for the revenue-ordered assortment strategy hold.
4.5. Envy-Free Pricing. In this section we observe that certain envy-free pricing problems
studied in theoretical computer science can be seen as special cases of the assortment problem
described in Section 2. The revenue-ordered assortments strategy then corresponds to the
so-called uniform pricing strategy studied in that area.
In an envy-free pricing problem, it is assumed that there is a single seller (a monopolist) who
has an unlimited supply of n different types of products (or items) that are all offered to a
set of m consumers. The seller assigns prices to the product types and then each consumer
buys at most one product. The seller’s problem consists in choosing the prices so that the
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revenue obtained from the resulting sales is maximised. Naturally, this revenue depends on the
behaviour of the consumers. The corresponding pricing problems are called unit demand envy-
free pricing (UDP) and differ only by their assumptions on the consumers’ behaviours. The
two main ones studied in the literature give rise to the UDPmin and UDPrank problems, which
we describe shortly. Before doing so, let us make a comment on the meaning of the adjective
‘envy-free’ appearing in these problems’ names: When the problems were first defined, the
seller not only had to assign item prices, but also had to assign items to consumers, under
the constraint that no consumer would have preferred receiving an item that was assigned
to someone else, that is, the allocation should be envy-free. Naturally, one can equivalently
assume that each customer picks their preferred choice once prices are set, which is how the
problems are usually phrased in the literature.
In the UDPmin problem, each consumer i ∈ [m] has an associated set Bi ⊆ [n] of items
that she is interested in buying, and a non-negative number vi (a valuation) which is the
maximum price she is willing to pay to buy an item from that set. Given a price assignment
p : [n] → R>0, consumer i buys the cheapest item from Bi (breaking ties arbitrarily) if there
is one with price at most vi, or none at all if there is none.
In the UDPrank problem, each consumer i ∈ [m] has an associated ranking φi : [n]→ [n] of the
products and a non-negative number v(i, x) (a valuation) for each product x ∈ [n] modelling
her willingness to pay for product x. Given a price assignment p : [n]→ R>0, consumer i then
considers items in order of her preference list φi and then buys the first item x that has price
at most v(i, x).
These two problems were introduced by Rusmevichientong in his Ph.D. thesis [38] and subse-
quently in [40]. Aggarwal et al. [2] and Guruswami et al. [24] analysed the revenue guarantees
of a simple pricing strategy called uniform pricing: The seller put the same price q on all prod-
ucts and chooses q so as to maximise the revenue. This can be seen as the revenue-ordered
assortments strategy on an auxiliary assortment problem, as will be explained in the next
section.
We close this section by mentioning a variant of UDPmin and UDPrank that was also studied
in the literature: The seller is moreover required to choose a price assignment p : [n] → R>0
that satisfies a price ordering (or price ladder) of the n items. This ordering, which is part of
the problem instance, is given as a permutation ψ : [n]→ [n]. The price assignment p chosen
by the seller must then satisfy
p(ψ(x)) 6 p(ψ(y))
for every products x, y ∈ [n] such that ψ(x) < ψ(y). The resulting problems are known as
UDPmin with price ladder (UDPminPL) and UDPrank with price ladder (UDPrankPL). This
variant was introduced by Aggarwal et al. [2].
4.5.1. UDPmin as an assortment problem. In this section we describe how the UDPmin prob-
lem can be seen as an assortment problem under some discrete choice model. The main
interest of this observation is that the resulting discrete choice model satisfies the regularity
condition, axiom (iv), and thus falls within the scope of the models studied in this paper.
As before, suppose that there are n products andm consumers, and let vi denote the valuation
of consumer i ∈ [m]. For simplicity, we assume without loss of generality that consumers’
valuations are such that v1 6 v2 6 · · · 6 vm. First we start with a standard observation about
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the UDPmin problem, namely, that in an optimal solution prices can be assumed to belong to
the set of consumer valuations (a proof is given in the Appendix):
Lemma 4.5. There exists an optimal price assignment p : [n] → R>0 such that p(x) ∈
{v1 . . . , vm} for all x ∈ [n].
The following theorem shows that the UDPmin problem is a special case of the assortment
problem under a regular discrete choice model.
Theorem 4.6. Consider an instance of the UDPmin problem with n products and m con-
sumers, and let vi denote the valuation of consumer i ∈ [m]. Then one can define an instance
of the assortment problem under a regular discrete choice model (i.e. a finite set C, a revenue
function r : C → R>0, and a system of choice probabilities P satisfying axioms (i), (ii), (iii)
and (iv)) with the same optimal revenue. Moreover, the uniform pricing and revenue-ordered
assortments strategies on respective instances are equivalent in the following sense:
• for each i ∈ [m] there exists S ⊆ C consisting of all products y′ ∈ C with r(y′) > r(y)
for some y ∈ C such that the price assignment assigning price vi to each product
x ∈ [n] for the UDPmin instance has the same revenue as the assortment S, and
• for each y ∈ C, there exists i ∈ [m] such that the assortment consisting of all products
y′ ∈ C with r(y′) > r(y) has the same revenue as the price assignment assigning price
vi to each product of the UDPmin instance.
Proof. As before, we may assume that v1 6 v2 6 · · · 6 vm. For each i ∈ [m], let Bi ⊆ [n]
denote the subset of items consumer i is interested in buying. Define the set C of products for
the assortment problem as follows:
C := [n]× {v1, . . . , vm}.
Thus C consists of all pairs of an item and a customer valuation. The revenue function
r : C → R>0 for the assortment problem is defined by setting
r((x, v)) := m · v
for all (x, v) ∈ C. (The purpose of the scaling factor m is to cancel out the 1/m factor in the
upcoming definition P.)
Next we define the system of choice probabilities P. To do so, we first need to define the
following sets:
Qi(S) :=
{
(x, v) ∈ S : x ∈ Bi, v 6 vi, and v
′ > v ∀(x′, v′) ∈ S s.t. x′ ∈ Bi
}
for each i ∈ [m] and S ⊆ C. Equipped with this notation, we define P as follows. For each
S ⊆ C and y ∈ C ∪ {0}, let
P(y, S) :=
1
m
m∑
i=1
Pi(y, S)
where Pi (i ∈ [m]) is defined by setting:
Pi((x, v), S) :=


1
|Qi(S)|
if (x, v) ∈ Qi(S)
0 otherwise
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for each (x, v) ∈ C, and
Pi(0, S) := 1−
∑
(x,v)∈S
Pi((x, v), S).
Let us prove that P is a regular discrete choice model. Clearly P(y, S) > 0 for every y ∈ C∪{0}
and S ⊆ C, thus axiom (i) is satisfied. If (x, v) ∈ C and S ⊆ C \ {(x, v)} then P((x, v), S) = 0
since (x, v) /∈ Qi(S) for each i ∈ [m]. Hence, axiom (ii) is satisfied. Also, for each S ⊆ C we
have
∑
(x,v)∈S P((x, v), S) 6 1 since ∑
(x,v)∈S
Pi((x, v), S) 6 1
for each i ∈ [m]. (In fact, the left-hand side is equal to either 0 or 1, depending on whether
Qi(S) is empty or not.) This implies that axiom (iii) holds. Therefore, it only remains to
check axiom (iv), the regularity condition. Clearly, by the definition of P, it is enough to
show that Pi satisfies axiom (iv) for each i ∈ [m]. Let thus i ∈ [m], let S ⊆ S
′ ⊆ C, and let
y ∈ S ∪ {0}. We wish to show that Pi(y, S) > Pi(y, S
′).
First suppose that y = (x, v) ∈ S. If (x, v) /∈ Qi(S
′) then Pi((x, v), S
′) = 0 and
Pi((x, v), S) > Pi((x, v), S
′) holds trivially, so assume (x, v) ∈ Qi(S
′). By the definition
of Qi(S), it follows that (x, v) ∈ Qi(S) as well. In fact, Qi(S) ⊆ Qi(S
′) in this case. This
implies that Pi((x, v), S) > Pi((x, v), S
′), as desired.
Next, assume that y = 0 (the no-choice option). We will use the following observation:
∑
(x,v)∈T
Pi((x, v), T ) =
{
1 if Qi(T ) 6= ∅
0 otherwise
for every T ⊆ C. If Qi(S) = ∅, using this observation with T = S we obtain
Pi(0, S) = 1−
∑
(x,v)∈S
Pi((x, v), S) = 1 > 1−
∑
(x,v)∈S′
Pi((x, v), S
′) = Pi(0, S
′)
as desired. Now suppose that Qi(S) 6= ∅. Observe that this implies Qi(S
′) 6= ∅ as well. We
then have
Pi(0, S) = 1−
∑
(x,v)∈S
Pi((x, v), S) = 1−
∑
(x,v)∈S′
Pi((x, v), S
′) = Pi(0, S
′)
where the second equality follows from the above observation (with T = S and T = S′).
Therefore, axiom (iv) is satisfied.
Next we prove that the maximum revenue achievable on each instance is the same. Given a
set S ⊆ C we define a corresponding price assignment pS by setting
pS(x) :=
{
min{v : (x, v) ∈ S} if ∃v s.t. (x, v) ∈ S
+∞ otherwise
for each x ∈ [n]. (Remark: If one wishes to insist on pS being real-valued, simply replace
+∞ in the above definition by any real larger than vm.) The revenue resulting from choosing
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assortment S can be expressed as follows:
∑
y ∈S
P(y, S) · r(y) =
1
m
∑
i∈[m]
∑
y∈S
Pi(y, S) · r(y) =
∑
i∈[m]
∑
(x,v)∈S
Pi((x, v), S) · v
=
∑
i∈[m]
∑
(x,v)∈Qi(S)
1
|Qi(S)|
·v=
∑
i∈[m],Qi(S)6=∅
min{v : (x, v)∈S for some x∈Bi}
Now, observe that Qi(S) is not empty if and only if there exists a product x ∈ Bi with price
pS(x) 6 vi, that is, if and only if customer i buys some product in the UDPmin instance
with price assignment pS . Furthermore, if she does, then she buys some product x
′ among
the cheapest ones in Bi, giving a revenue of pS(x
′) = min{v : (x′, v) ∈ S} = min{v : (x, v) ∈
S, x ∈ Bi}. Thus, we deduce that the revenue of assortment S is equal to the revenue resulting
from price assignment pS .
It follows that the maximum revenue achievable on this assortment problem instance is at
most that of the UDPmin instance. Furthermore, if S ⊆ C is an assortment consisting of all
products y′ ∈ C with r(y′) > r(y) for some y ∈ C then the corresponding price assignment
pS satisfies pS(x) = min{v : (x, v) ∈ S} = pS(x
′) for all x, x′ ∈ [n] and is thus uniform, as
desired. This shows one direction of the theorem.
To prove the other direction, suppose that p is a price assignment such that p(x) ∈ {v1, . . . , vm}
for all x ∈ [n]. (Recall that there is an optimal price assignment of this form, by Lemma 4.5.)
We define a corresponding assortment Sp ⊆ C by setting
Sp := {(x, v) : x ∈ [n], v ∈ {v1, . . . , vm}, v > p(x)}.
Rewriting the revenue provided by assortment Sp similarly as before, we see:
∑
y ∈S
P(y, Sp) · r(y) =
1
m
∑
i∈[m]
∑
y∈S
Pi(y, Sp) · r(y) =
∑
i∈[m]
∑
(x,v)∈S
Pi((x, v), S) · v
=
∑
i∈[m]
∑
x∈[n]
Pi((x, p(x)), Sp) · p(x)
=
∑
i∈[m],Qi(Sp)6=∅
min{p(x) : (x, p(x)) ∈ S for some x ∈ Bi}
=
∑
i∈[m],Qi(Sp)6=∅
min{p(x) : x ∈ Bi}
Observe that the last expression is exactly the revenue given by price assignment p. Thus
the optimal revenue for the UDPmin instance is at most that of the assortment problem
instance. Since by the previous paragraph it is also at least that, the two quantities are equal.
Moreover, if p assigns the same price vi to all products x ∈ [n] then Sp consists of all y
′ ∈ C
with r(y′) > m · vi, and is therefore of the desired form. This concludes the proof. 
We note that Aouad et al. [7] independently constructed a similar reduction to the one pro-
posed above. Their objective is different from ours: they use the reduction to prove an
APX-hardness result for the assortment problem under the RUM model even when there are
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only two different prices, whereas our objective is to observe the strong connection that ex-
ists between uniform pricing for the UDPmin problem and revenue-ordered assortments in
assortment optimisation.
Combining Theorem 4.6 with Theorem 3.2, we obtain as a corollary a new revenue guarantee
for the uniform pricing strategy.
Corollary 4.7. The uniform pricing strategy for the UDPmin problem approximates the op-
timum revenue to within a factor of 1(1+ln ρ) , where ρ := vm/v1.
Theorem 4.6 together with Theorem 3.3 yield the following bound, which was originally proved
by Aggarwal et al. [2]. The proof is given in the Appendix.
Corollary 4.8 (Aggarwal et al. [2]). The uniform pricing strategy for the UDPmin problem
approximates the optimum revenue to within a factor of 1(1+lnm) .
4.5.2. UDPrank as an assortment problem. In this section we note that the UDPrank problem
can also be seen as an assortment problem under a regular discrete choice model. As in the
previous section, suppose that there are n products and m consumers. In an optimal solution
of the UDPrank problem, prices can always be assumed to belong to the set of consumer
valuations. The proof is a straightforward adaptation of that of Lemma 4.5 and is thus
omitted.
Lemma 4.9. There exists an optimal price assignment p : [n] → R>0 such that p(x) ∈
{v(i, x) : i ∈ [m], x ∈ [n]} for all x ∈ [n].
The following theorem shows that the UDPrank problem is a special case of the assortment
problem under a regular discrete choice model. It can be proved along the same lines as the
proof of Theorem 4.6. To keep the paper concise, we leave the proof to the reader.
Theorem 4.10. Consider an instance of the UDPrank problem with n products and m con-
sumers, and let v(i, x) denote the valuation of consumer i ∈ [m] for product x ∈ [n]. Then
one can define an instance of the assortment problem under a regular discrete choice model
(i.e. a finite set C, a revenue function r : C → R>0, and a system of choice probabilities P
satisfying axioms (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv)) with the same optimal revenue. Moreover, the uni-
form pricing and revenue-ordered assortments strategies on respective instances are equivalent
in the following sense:
• for each (i, x) ∈ [m] × [n] there exists S ⊆ C consisting of all products y′ ∈ C with
r(y′) > r(y) for some y ∈ C such that the price assignment of setting price v(i, x) to
every item of the UDPrank instance has the same revenue as the assortment S, and
• for each y ∈ C, there exists (i, x) ∈ [m]× [n] such that the assortment consisting of all
products y′ ∈ C with r(y′) > r(y) has the same revenue as the price assignment that
sets price v(i, x) to each item of the UDPrank instance.
Thanks to Theorem 4.10, we know that using the uniform pricing strategy on an instance I of
the UDPrank problem has the same performance as the revenue-ordered assortment strategy on
the instance I ′ of the assortment problem associated to I. Combining this with Theorem 3.2,
we obtain the following corollary:
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Corollary 4.11. The uniform pricing strategy approximates the UDPrank problem to within
a factor of 1(1+ln ρ) , where ρ := max{v(i, e) : i ∈ [m], e ∈ [n]}/min{v(i, e) : i ∈ [m], e ∈ [n]}.
Similarly as for the UDPmin problem, we can also apply Theorem 3.3 to derive the following
bound that is a function of the number of consumers, which was already established by Ag-
garwal et al. [2]:
Corollary 4.12 (Aggarwal et al. [2]). The uniform pricing strategy approximates the UDPrank
problem to within a factor of 1(1+lnm) .
We end this section with the remark that our results on UDPmin and UDPrank also hold
for the variant of these two problems involving a price ladder (as defined at the beginning of
this section). This is because adding the price ladder constraint can only decrease the seller’s
optimum revenue and the uniform pricing strategy always satisfies the price ladder constraint.
4.6. Stackelberg pricing. In this section we consider a pricing problem called Stackelberg
Minimum Spanning Tree problem that was introduced by Cardinal et al. [14]. We show
that this problem can be restated as an assortment problem under a specific discrete choice
model satisfying the regularity condition. Furthermore, the so-called uniform pricing algorithm
for the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree problem corresponds then to revenue-ordered
assortments. This connection allows us to see the results on uniform pricing obtained by
Cardinal et al. [14] as being a special case of the approximation guarantees of revenue-ordered
assortments established in Section 3. (We note that the results from [14] are currently the
best known approximation factors for the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree problem.)
An instance of the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree problem consists of an (undirected,
simple) graph G, a bipartition of the edges of G into a set R of red edges and a set B of
blue edges, and a cost function c : R → R>0 assigning a positive cost to each red edge. The
objective is to choose a price assignment p : B → R>0 for the blue edges so that the revenue
resulting from a consumer buying a minimum weight spanning tree of G is maximised. The
latter revenue is the sum of the prices p(e) of all blue edges e ∈ B that appear in the spanning
tree.
Let us remark that if there is no spanning tree of G consisting only of red edges, then the
optimal revenue is unbounded. Indeed, the customer is then forced to buy at least one blue
edge, and thus one could price all blue edges arbitrarily high, knowing that at least one will
be bought by the customer. To avoid such trivialities, we always assume that there exists a
red spanning tree in the instance under consideration.
As is well known, a minimum weight spanning tree can be obtained by the greedy (a.k.a.
Kruskal’s) algorithm, which consists in first ordering the edges in non-decreasing order of
costs and then considering each edge in order, and selecting it if it does not create a cycle with
edges that have already been selected. Moreover, every minimum weight spanning tree can
be obtained this way, by selecting an adequate ordering of the edges (the freedom in choosing
the ordering being how ties are broken for edges having the same cost). Thus we may assume
that the customer builds her minimum weight spanning tree by running the greedy algorithm
following some ordering of the edges. While we do not necessarily know the latter ordering
completely (in case there are ties), it will be assumed that the customer always gives priorities
to blue edges over red edges in case of ties. This technical assumption is needed to make
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sure that the revenue resulting from pricing the blue edges is independent of the particular
spanning tree bought by the customer. An informal justification for this assumption is that
in case of a tie between a blue edge and red edge, we could decrease the price of the blue edge
by an arbitrarily small amount to make sure it is considered first.
The purpose of this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.13. Consider an instance of the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree problem,
consisting of graph G, a bipartition of the edges into a set R of red edges and a set B of
blue edges, and a cost function c : R → R>0. Let c1, . . . , ck denote the different values
taken by the cost function, in non-decreasing order. Then one can define an instance of
the assortment problem under a regular discrete choice model (i.e. a finite set C, a revenue
function r : C → R>0, and a system of choice probabilities P satisfying axioms (i), (ii), (iii)
and (iv)) with the same optimal revenue. Moreover, the uniform pricing and revenue-ordered
assortments strategies on respective instances are equivalent in the following sense:
• for each i ∈ [k] there exists S ⊆ C consisting of all products y′ ∈ C with r(y′) > r(y)
for some y ∈ C such that the price assignment assigning price ci to each edge e ∈ B
for the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree instance has the same revenue as the
assortment S, and
• for each y ∈ C, there exists i ∈ [k] such that the assortment consisting of all products
y′ ∈ C with r(y′) > r(y) has the same revenue as the price assignment assigning price
ci to each blue edge of the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree instance.
Theorem 4.13 can in fact be proved in the more general setting of matroids and the corre-
sponding Stackelberg Matroid problem, as we now explain. First we recall basic definitions
regarding matroids. A matroid is a pair (E,X ) with E a finite set of elements and X a
collection of subsets of E called independent sets that satisfy the following three properties:
• ∅ ∈ X ;
• if X ∈ X and Y ⊆ X then Y ∈ X , and
• if X,Y ∈ X with |X|< |Y | then there exists y ∈ Y −X such that X ∪ {y} ∈ X .
An inclusion-wise maximal independent set of a matroid is said to be a base of the matroid.
Note that all bases have the same cardinality, as follows from the above axioms.
Given a linear ordering L of the elements of a matroid M = (E,X ), the greedy algorithm
computes a base of M using L as follows: Enumerating the elements of E as e1, e2, . . . , em
according to L, the greedy algorithm defines m+1 independent sets I0, I1, . . . , Im inductively,
by first setting I0 := ∅, and then for each i = 1, . . . ,m, by setting Ii := Ii−1∪{ei} if Ii−1∪{ei}
is independent (i.e. if it is in X ), and Ii := Ii−1 otherwise. The algorithm then outputs Im,
the last independent set it computed. It is easily seen that the latter is a base of the matroid.
It is sometimes convenient to run the greedy algorithm on a subset F of the elements of the
matroid M under consideration. The behaviour is exactly the same as described above but
with respect to the elements e1, . . . , ek of F ordered according to the ordering induced by L.
The resulting independent set is of course not necessarily a base ofM , though it is of maximal
size among independent sets contained in F .
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The following lemma is a well-known and fundamental property of the greedy algorithm on
matroids. We provide a proof in the Appendix, to keep the paper self-contained. (For more
background results on matroids and the greedy algorithm, the reader is referred to the textbook
of [43].)
Lemma 4.14. Let M = (E,X ) be a matroid and let L be a linear ordering of the elements
of E. For F ⊆ E, let greedyM (F,L) denote the independent subset of F obtained by running
the greedy algorithm on the set F using ordering L. Then for every F ⊆ F ′ ⊆ E the following
two properties hold:
(i) |greedyM (F
′, L)|> |greedyM (F,L)|, and
(ii) F ∩ greedyM (F
′, L) ⊆ greedyM (F,L).
The Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree problem is a special case of the Stackelberg Matroid
problem, where we are given a matroid M = (E,X ), a bipartition of the elements set E into
a set R of red elements and a set B of blue elements, and a cost function c : R → R>0.
The objective is to choose a price assignment p : B → R>0 for the blue elements so that the
revenue resulting from a consumer buying a minimum-weight basis of M is maximised. The
latter revenue is the sum of the prices p(e) of all blue elements e ∈ B that appear in the basis.
Exactly as for Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree problem, in a Stackelberg Matroid instance
it is always assumed that there exists a basis of M that consists only of red elements, since
otherwise the optimum revenue is unbounded. As recalled earlier, once prices are set for blue
elements, a minimum-weight basis of M can be computed using the greedy algorithm with an
ordering of the elements in R ∪ B that is compatible with these costs/prices. In case of ties
we assume that priority is given to blue elements over red elements, for the same reason as
before.
We remark that, given a price assignment p : B → R>0, there might be more than one possible
ordering of the elements in R∪B compatible with these prices, and we do not know which one
will be used by the customer when computing her minimum-weight basis. Nevertheless, the
resulting revenue is always the same (and in particular the optimum revenue is well defined).
This follows from the following lemma, whose proof can be found in the Appendix.
Lemma 4.15. Consider an instance of the Stackelberg Matroid problem, consisting of matroid
M = (E,X ), a bipartition of the elements set E into a set R of red elements and a set B of blue
elements, and a cost function c : R → R>0. Consider some price assignment p : B → R>0.
Then for every two linear orderings L and L′ of the elements in R ∪ B that are compatible
with these costs and prices, and for every γ ∈ R, we have
|{e ∈ B ∩ greedyM (R ∪B,L) : p(e) = γ}|= |{e ∈ B ∩ greedyM (R ∪B,L
′) : p(e) = γ}|.
In particular, the revenue resulting from price assignment p is independent of the particular
ordering used by the customer.
As mentioned earlier, it turns out that Theorem 4.13 can be proved for any Stackelberg
Matroid problem, that is, the only property that is really needed is that the set of forests of a
graph form a matroid (its graphical matroid). Moreover, we find it easier to use the language
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of matroids in the proof. We thus prove the following generalisation of Theorem 4.13, see the
Appendix for the proof.
Theorem 4.16. Consider an instance of the Stackelberg Matroid problem, consisting of ma-
troid M = (E,X ), a bipartition of the elements set E into a set R of red elements and a
set B of blue elements, and a cost function c : R → R>0. Let c1, . . . , ck denote the different
values taken by the cost function, in non-decreasing order. Then one can define an instance
of the assortment problem under a regular discrete choice model (i.e. a finite set C, a revenue
function r : C → R>0, and a system of choice probabilities P satisfying axioms (i), (ii), (iii)
and (iv)) with the same optimal revenue. Moreover, the uniform pricing and revenue-ordered
assortments strategies on respective instances are equivalent in the following sense:
• for each i ∈ [k] there exists S ⊆ C consisting of all products y′ ∈ C with r(y′) > r(y)
for some y ∈ C such that the price assignment assigning price ci to each element
e ∈ B for the Stackelberg Matroid instance has the same revenue as the assortment S,
and
• for each y ∈ C, there exists i ∈ [k] such that the assortment consisting of all products
y′ ∈ C with r(y′) > r(y) has the same revenue as the price assignment assigning price
ci to each blue element of the Stackelberg Matroid instance.
We note that specialising Theorems 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 to the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning
Tree problem via Theorem 4.13, we obtain exactly the three bounds on the uniform pricing
algorithm proved by Cardinal et al. [14] (see Theorem 3 in that paper). As shown by the
latter authors, these three bounds are already tight in this specific setting.
The reader familiar with polymatroids will undoubtedly have noticed that the proofs of the
results presented in this section extend directly to the setting of polymatroids. This is because
all properties of the greedy algorithm we used hold more generally in that setting. Therefore,
Theorem 4.16 remains true for the natural extension of the Stackelberg Matroid problem to
polymatroids. We nevertheless decided to present the material of this section in the language
of matroids to simplify the exposition, the reader interested in the definition and properties
of polymatroids is referred to [43].
5. Nesting-by-fare-order property under the multi-period setting
In this short section we consider the multi-period model introduced by Talluri and Van Ryzin
[44] and analyse the solution structure of the assortments offered as the available capacity and
remaining time decreases. We prove that the two monotonicity results that were originally
shown by Rusmevichientong et al. [42] for Mixed MNL models naturally extend to the case
of regular discrete choice models. As discussed in Rusmevichientong et al. [42], these results
could potentially be used in the implementation of standard revenue management systems.
First, let us define formally the multi-period model of Talluri and Van Ryzin [44]: It is assumed
that sales occur over a finite horizon of T time periods and that there is a maximum number
Q of items that the firm can sell along the complete time horizon. For a concrete example,
suppose that the firm is selling seats on a flight leg (Q represents the number of seats) and that
items in C represent the different fare classes, each having an associated price (or revenue).
At each time period, based on the time periods remaining and the available capacity, the firm
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selects a choice set S ⊆ C to offer to customers. Then, a single customer arrives and decides
which item to buy from S (if any).
Let us assume that consumers follow a regular discrete choice model, and let P denote the
corresponding system of choice probabilities. In order to simplify notations, we further assume
that items in C = {1, . . . , N} are sorted in non-increasing order of revenue, that is, r(i) >
r(i + 1) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}. We suppose from now on that the firm always offers
revenue-ordered assortments, during the whole time horizon.
In the discussion below, it will be more convenient to measure the remaining time before the
end of the time horizon than the time elapsed since the beginning. Suppose thus that we
are t ∈ [T ] periods prior to the end of the time horizon. Assume further that the available
inventory of items that the firm can sell is q ∈ [Q]. As in Section 3, let r1, r2, . . . , rk be the
distinct values taken by the revenue function r, sorted in non-decreasing order (therefore,
r(1) = rk and r(N) = r1). Let j(ℓ) be the index such that {1, 2, . . . , j(ℓ)} is the set of the
items with revenue at least rℓ, for ℓ = 1, . . . , k. Define Jt(q) as the expected revenue of the
revenue-ordered strategy over the remaining t periods, given that there are q units left in the
inventory at the current time period. Let also Jt(q, ℓ) denote the expected revenue obtained,
given that there are q units left in the inventory at the current time period, and we offer the
set consisting of all items with revenue at least rℓ at the current time period, and then proceed
with the revenue-ordered strategy for the remaining time periods. Thus
Jt(q) = max
ℓ∈[k]
Jt(q, ℓ).
Moreover, if t > 0 and q > 0, then Jt(q, ℓ) satisfies the following relation:
Jt(q, ℓ) =
j(ℓ)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ)}) · (r(x) + Jt−1(q − 1)) + P(0, {1, . . . , j(ℓ)}) · Jt−1(q).
(As expected, we set Jt(q, ℓ) = 0 in case q = 0 or t = 0.)
Let ℓ∗t (q) := min{ℓ ∈ [k] : Jt(q, ℓ) = Jt(q)}.
The following theorem, which generalises Theorem 6 in Rusmevichientong et al. [42], estab-
lishes the monotinicity properties of revenue ordered assortments alluded to at the beginning
of this section. In words, it shows that the function ℓ∗ is non-increasing in the remaining
capacity and non-decreasing in the time remaining.
Theorem 5.1. Let t ∈ [T ] and let q ∈ [Q]. Then
• ℓ∗t (q) 6 ℓ
∗
t (q − 1) if q > 2, and
• ℓ∗t (q) > ℓ
∗
t−1(q) if t > 2.
The proof of Theorem 5.1 is given in the Appendix.
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6. Final remarks
In this paper we studied the performance of a simple and well-known heuristic for the assort-
ment problem, known as revenue-ordered assortment. We provided three worst-case perfor-
mance guarantees that are written as a function of product prices as well as the distribution
of product purchases in an optimal solution. An appealing feature of our performance guar-
antees is that they simply rely on the following condition known as regularity: the probability
of selecting a specific product from the set being offered cannot increase if the set is enlarged.
This condition is satisfied by almost all discrete choice models considered in the revenue man-
agement and choice theory literature, and in particular by the well-known random utility
model (RUM). Furthermore, we show that the three bounds are exactly tight, even when one
restricts to the RUM subfamily.
We found a remarkable connection between two pricing problems called unit demand envy-free
pricing and Stackelberg minimum spanning tree studied in the theoretical computer science
literature and the assortment problem under a regular discrete choice model. In essence, we
show that both pricing problems can be seen as assortment problems under discrete choice
models satisfying the regularity condition. In addition, the revenue-ordered assortments strat-
egy correspond then to the well-studied uniform pricing heuristic. Interestingly, the bounds
from the revenue-ordered assortment are able to match and unify known results on uniform
pricing that were proved separately in the literature for the envy-free pricing problems and
the Stackelberg minimum spanning tree problem.
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Appendix A
See Table 6 for a (non-exhaustive) list of discrete choice models that satisfy the regularity
axiom.
Discrete Choice Model Reference
MNL Luce [29]
Mixed MNL Rusmevichientong et al. [42]
Markov Chain Model Blanchet et al. [10]
Mallows Model Mallows [31]
Mixture of Distance Based Models Murphy and Martin [36]
Stochastic Preference Block and Marschak [11]
Random Utility Model Thurstone [46]
Bounded Accumulation Model Webb [47]
Additive Perturbed Utility (*) Fudenberg et al. [23]
Hitting Fuzzy Attention Model (*) Aguiar [3]
Non-Additive Random Utility (*) McClellon et al. [33]
Table 1. List of discrete choice models that satisfy the regularity axiom (non-
exhaustive). Models marked with an asterisk are not RUM.
Appendix B
In this section we provide the proofs missing from the main text.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Recall from Section 4.1 that every discrete choice model based on ran-
dom utility can also be described by means of a probability distribution over all rankings of
the elements in C ∪ {0} (see for instance Block and Marschak [11]). Let SN+1 denote the set
of all such rankings, and let αi be the probability of choosing the ranking ≺i∈ SN+1. Then
the system of choice probabilities for our RUM can be written as
P (x, S) =
∑
≺i∈SN+1
αi1{x ≺i y ∀y ∈ (S \ {x}) ∪ {0}}
for all S ⊆ C and x ∈ S.
Consider now, for every ranking ≺i∈ SN+1 , the function Di(S) : 2
C → {0, 1} defined as
Di(S) =
∑
x∈S
1{x ≺i y ∀y ∈ (S \ {x}) ∪ {0}}.
Observe that Di(S) = 0 if ≺i puts element 0 before all elements in S, and Di(S) = 1 otherwise.
Let us show that Di(S) is submodular. That is, for every S ⊆ S
′ ⊆ C and x ∈ C,
Di(S
′ ∪ {x})−Di(S
′) 6 Di(S ∪ {x}) −Di(S). (11)
First, observe that Di is monotone (i.e. Di(S) 6 Di(S
′) if S ⊆ S′). Second, observe that
if the LHS in (11) is equal to zero, the inequality directly follows. Consider then the case
in which the LHS is equal to 1. This implies that Di(S
′) = 0, and thus Di(S) = 0, and
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that Di(S
′ ∪ {x}) = 1. Hence, x ≺i y for all y ∈ S
′ ∪ {0}, which means that x ≺i y for all
y ∈ S ∪ {0}. Therefore, Di(S ∪ {x}) = 1, and the inequality (11) follows.
To finish the proof of the lemma, observe that
f(S) =
∑
x∈S
P(x, S)
=
∑
x∈S
∑
≺i∈SN+1
αi1{x ≺i y ∀y ∈ (S \ {x}) ∪ {0}}
=
∑
≺i∈SN+1
αi
∑
x∈S
1{x ≺i y ∀y ∈ (S \ {x}) ∪ {0}}
=
∑
≺i∈SN+1
αiDi(S).
Since the sum of submodular functions is also submodular, the proof is now complete. 
Proof of Lemma 4.5. Let p : [n]→ R>0 denote an optimal price assignment and suppose there
is an item x ∈ [n] such that p(x) = q /∈ {v1, . . . , vm}. If no consumer buys product x at price
q then the seller would obtain the same revenue if the price for product x were changed to vm,
as is easily checked. If, on the other hand, there is a consumer that buys product x at price q,
we do the following modification. Let w denote the lowest consumer valuation that is greater
or equal to q, that is, w = min{vj : j ∈ [m] and vj > q}. Suppose now that the seller modifies
the price assignment p by setting p(x) := w. First, observe that every consumer buying a
product different from x is unaffected by this modification since the price of product x has not
decreased. Second, every consumer that was buying product x before either still buys it under
the new price assignment, or buys another product y from her set with price q 6 p(y) 6 w.
Hence, the seller’s revenue does not decrease. Repeating this argument at most n times, we
eventually obtain a price assignment that satisfies this lemma. 
Proof of Corollary 4.8. To be precise, this corollary follows from the proof of Theorem 4.6,
as we now explain. Consider the assortment problem instance associated to a given UDPmin
instance described in that proof. As in Theorem 3.3, let S∗ ⊆ C denote an optimal solution
to this instance and let
Ni :=
∑
x∈S∗,
r(x)>ri
P(x, S∗)
for each i ∈ [k]. For convenience, let us scall these quantities by a factor m: For each i ∈ [k],
let
Nˆi := Ni ·m.
Then Nˆ1 is exactly the number of consumers of the UDPmin instance that buy some item in
the optimal solution. Thus,
Nˆ1 6 m. (12)
Moreover, letting ℓ ∈ [k] be maximum such that Nˆℓ > 0, we have that Nˆℓ is the number of
consumers that buy the most expensive item that was sold in the optimal solution. Hence,
Nˆℓ > 1. (13)
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By Theorem 3.3, the revenue-ordered assortments strategy approximates the optimum to
within a factor of
1
1 + ln(N1/Nℓ)
=
1
1 + ln(Nˆ1/Nˆℓ)
6
1
1 + lnm
,
where the last inequality follows from (12) and (13)). The claim then follows from Theorem 4.6.

Proof of Lemma 4.14. Let G := greedyM (F,L) and G
′ := greedyM (F
′, L). To see the first
property, suppose for a contradiction that |G′|< |G|. Enumerate the elements of F ′ as
e1, . . . , ek following the ordering L. Let ei ∈ G − G
′ be such that G′ ∪ {ei} is indepen-
dent. In particular, (G′ ∩ {e1, . . . , ei−1}) ∪ {ei} is also independent. This implies that when
greedy considered the i-th element of F ′, ei, it added ei in the set being built, a contradiction.
Let us now prove the second property. Enumerate the elements of F this time as e1, . . . , ek
according to L. Arguing by contradiction, suppose that ei ∈ G
′ − G for some i. We may
assume that index i is minimum with this property. Thus, G′ ∩ {e1, . . . , ei−1} ⊆ G.
Let I := G ∩ {e1, . . . , ei−1}. Thus I ∪ {ei} is not independent, by definition of the greedy
algorithm. Let K be an independent set satisfying I ⊆ K ⊆ I ∪ G′ and inclusion-wise
maximal with this property. Let us point out that ei /∈ K, since I ⊆ K.
Case 1: |K|< |G′|. Since G′ is independent there exists e ∈ G′ − K such that K ∪ {e} is
independent, which contradicts the maximality of K.
Case 2: |K|> |G′|. SinceK is independent there exists e ∈ K−G′ = I−G′ such thatG′∪{e} is
independent. However, when building G′ the greedy algorithm did not pick element e because
the subset J ⊆ G′ of elements it already picked when considering e was such that J∪{e} is not
independent. Since J ∪ {e} ⊆ G′ ∪ {e}, this contradicts the fact that G′ ∪ {e} is independent.
Case 3: |K|= |G′|. Here, we use that |K|> |G′ − {ei}|, which implies that there exists
e ∈ K − (G′ − {ei}) such that (G
′ − {ei}) ∪ {e} is independent. Since ei /∈ K, we have
K − (G′ − {ei}) = K −G
′ = I −G′, and it follows that e = ej for some j < i, meaning that
ej was considered before ei by the greedy algorithm when building set G
′. Yet the algorithm
did not pick ej when it considered ej , because the subset J ⊆ G
′ of elements it already
picked at that time could not be extended into an independent set by adding ej . However,
J ∪ {e} ⊆ (G′ − {ei}) ∪ {ej}, contradicting the independence of (G
′ − {ei}) ∪ {ej}.
Since in each of the three cases we derived a contradiction, we deduced that the second
property holds, as claimed. 
Proof of Lemma 4.15. This is a consequence of the following more general property of the
greedy algorithm: Suppose that E is partitioned into ℓ blocks E1, . . . , Eℓ, and that L and L
′
are two linear orderings of the elements in E that agree on this block partition, in the sense
that e <L f and e <L′ f for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} and e ∈ Ei, f ∈ Ei+1. Then
(14)|greedyM (E,L) ∩Ei|= |greedyM (E,L
′) ∩Ei| ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
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To see that it implies the lemma, it suffices to take the partition of E obtained by partitioning
R according to the costs of the red elements and B according to the prices of the blue elements,
and ordering the resulting blocks in non-decreasing order of costs/prices, giving priority to
blue over red in case of ties.
Thus it remains to prove (14). Arguing by contradiction, suppose that the property does
not hold and let i be the smallest index such that |greedyM (E,L) ∩ Ei|6= |greedyM (E,L
′) ∩
Ei|. Say without loss of generality |greedyM (E,L) ∩ Ei|< |greedyM (E,L
′) ∩ Ei|. By our
choice of i, |greedyM (E,L) ∩ (E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ei−1)|= |greedyM (E,L
′) ∩ (E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ei−1)|. Since
|greedyM (E,L) ∩ (E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ei)|< |greedyM (E,L
′) ∩ (E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ei)|, by the last of the
matroid axioms there exists e ∈ (greedyM (E,L
′) − greedyM (E,L)) ∩ (E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ei) such
that (greedyM (E,L) ∩ (E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ei)) ∪ {e} is independent. Hence, the greedy algorithm
w.r.t. ordering L could have picked e when considering the elements in Ei but did not, a
contradiction. 
Proof of Theorem 4.16. Define the set C of products for the assortment problem as follows:
C := B × {c1, . . . , ck}.
Thus C consists of all pairs of a blue element and a cost ci taken by some red element. The
revenue function r : C → R>0 for the assortment problem is defined by setting
r((e, q)) := |B|·q
for all (e, q) ∈ C.
Next we define the system of choice probabilities P. To do so, it is convenient to first define
an auxiliary matroid M ′ with ground set R∪C, where X ⊆ R∪C is independent if only if the
following two conditions are satisfied:
(1) |{(e, q) : q ∈ {c1, . . . , ck}}|6 1 for each element e ∈ B, and
(2) (R ∩X) ∪ {e ∈ B : (e, q) ∈ X for some q ∈ {c1, . . . , ck}} is independent in M .
We leave it to the reader to check that M ′ is indeed a matroid. In order to give some intuition
about M ′, we remark that in the case of the Stackelberg Minimum Spanning Tree problem,
where M is the graphical matroid of the input graph, M ′ is simply the graphical matroid of
the graph obtained by replacing each edge e with k parallel copies of e.
For simplicity, let us say that the cost of element x ∈ R ∪ C is c(x) if x ∈ R, and q if
x = (e, q) ∈ C. Let L be a linear ordering of the elements in R∪C that is consistent with their
associated costs (elements appear in non-decreasing order of cost), where priority is given to
elements in C over those in R (that is, if (e, q) ∈ C, f ∈ R, and c(f) = q, then (e, q) <L f).
We define P as follows. For each S ⊆ C and (e, q) ∈ C, let
P((e, q), S) :=


1
|B|
if (e, q) ∈ greedyM ′(R ∪ S,L)
0 otherwise
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and
P(0, S) := 1−
∑
(e,q)∈S
P((e, q), S).
Let us prove that P is a regular discrete choice model. Clearly P(y, S) > 0 for every y ∈ C∪{0}
and S ⊆ C, thus axiom (i) is satisfied. If (e, q) ∈ C and S ⊆ C \ {(e, q)} then P((e, q), S) = 0
since (e, q) /∈ greedyM ′(S,L) trivially. Hence, axiom (ii) is satisfied. Also, for each S ⊆ C we
have
∑
(e,q)∈S P((e, q), S) 6 |greedyM ′(R∪S,L)|/|B|6 1, since |greedyM ′(R∪S,L)|6 |B|. This
implies that axiom (iii) holds. Therefore, it only remains to check axiom (iv), the regularity
condition. Let thus S ⊆ S′ ⊆ C, and let y ∈ S∪{0}. We want to show that P(y, S) > P(y, S′).
First suppose that y = (e, q) ∈ S. If P((e, q), S′) = 0, then trivially P((e, q), S) > P((e, q), S′).
If P((e, q), S′) = 1/|B|, then (e, q) ∈ greedyM ′(R ∪ S
′, L). By Lemma 4.14, we also have
(e, q) ∈ greedyM ′(R ∪ S,L), and thus P((e, q), S) = 1/|B|. Hence, P((e, q), S) > P((e, q), S
′)
holds in both cases.
Now assume that y = 0 is the no-choice option. We know from Lemma 4.14 that (R ∪ S) ∩
greedyM ′(R∪ S
′, L) ⊆ greedyM ′(R∪ S,L). Since |greedyM ′(R∪S
′, L)|> |greedyM ′(R∪S,L)|
by the same lemma, and since (R ∪ S′)− (R ∪ S) = S′ − S ⊆ C, we deduce that
|greedyM ′(R ∪ S
′, L) ∩ C|> |greedyM ′(R ∪ S,L) ∩ C|.
This implies that
∑
(e,q)∈S′ P((e, q), S
′) >
∑
(e,q)∈S P((e, q), S), and we conclude that
P(0, S) = 1−
∑
(e,q)∈S
P((e, q), S) > 1−
∑
(e,q)∈S′
P((e, q), S′) = P(0, S′).
Therefore, axiom (iv) is satisfied.
Next we prove that the maximum revenue achievable on each instance is the same. Given a
set S ⊆ C we define a corresponding price assignment pS by setting
pS(e) :=
{
min{q : (e, q) ∈ S} if ∃q s.t. (e, q) ∈ S
+∞ otherwise
for each element e ∈ B. The revenue resulting from choosing assortment S can be expressed
as follows:
∑
y ∈S
P(y, S) · r(y) = |B|
∑
(e,q)∈S
P((e, q), S) · q =
∑
(e,q)∈greedyM′ (R∪S,L)
q.
In the Stackelberg Matroid instance with price assignment pS , the customer buys element
e ∈ B if and only if the greedy algorithm chooses element e when considering matroid M with
some linear ordering L∗ of its elements R∪B that is consistent with their costs/prices, where
priority is given to elements in B in case of ties. That is, letting c′(e) := c(e) if e ∈ R and
c′(e) := pS(e) if e ∈ B, the ordering L
∗ used by the customer satisfies:
(15a)if c′(e) < cS(f) then e <L∗ f for every e, f ∈ R ∪B, and
(15b)if c′(e) = cS(f) then e <L∗ f for every e ∈ B and f ∈ R.
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There might be more than one linear ordering satisfying the above properties; however thanks
to Lemma 4.15 we know that all such orderings yield the same revenue. Since we are not
interested in the particular elements bought by the customer but only by the resulting revenue,
for the purpose of the following analysis we may assume that L∗ ‘breaks ties’ in the same that
L does, that is,
∀e, f ∈ B : e <L∗ f ⇔ (e, pS(e)) <L (f, pS(f));
∀e, f ∈ R : e <L∗ f ⇔ e <L f.
Element e ∈ B is bought by the customer if and only if e ∈ greedyM (R ∪ B,L
∗), which by
our assumption on L∗ is the same condition as (e, pS(e)) ∈ greedyM ′(R ∪ S,L). Furthermore,
if (e, q) ∈ greedyM ′(R ∪ S,L) for some q then this q is unique and by definition of the price
functin pS we have pS(e) = q. Hence, the revenue resulting from price function pS equals
∑
e ∈greedyM (R∪B,L
∗)
pS(e) =
∑
(e,q)∈greedyM′(R∪S,L)
q,
and is thus equal to the revenue given by assortment S. This shows that the maximum revenue
achievable on the Stackelberg Matroid instance is at least that achievable on the assortment
problem we defined. We now prove the converse statement, and hence that the two quantities
are the same.
Let p be some price function for the elements in B and let L∗ be a linear ordering of the
elements in R∪B that a customer could use when running the greedy algorithm on M under
this price assignment. As recalled above, L∗ is thus any linear ordering satisfying (15a) and
(15b), where in this case c′(·) is modified by setting c′(e) := p(e) if e ∈ B.
We may assume that all prices assigned by p to elements in B are in the set {c1, . . . , ck}∪{+∞}.
Indeed, if ci−1 < p(e) < ci for some e ∈ B and i ∈ {1, . . . , k} (where we let c0 := 0) then we
can increase p(e) to ci without changing L
∗ being a valid ordering for these prices, which can
only improve the resulting revenue. Similarly, if p(e) > ck then we may as well set p(e) := +∞
since element e will never be bought by the customer, as follows from the existence of a base of
M in R. Since our goal is to bound from above the revenue resulting from price assignment p
by the optimal revenue achievable on the assortment problem, we may thus iteratively modify
p as described until it has the desired form.
Relying on the fact that p takes values in {c1, . . . , ck} ∪ {+∞}, we define the following corre-
sponding assortment S ⊆ C:
S := {(e, p(e)) : e ∈ greedyM (R ∪B,L
∗)}.
The ordering L∗ of the elements in R ∪ B induces in a natural way an ordering L of the
elements in R ∪ S. The revenue given by assortment S is then
∑
y ∈S
P(y, S) · r(y) = |B|
∑
(e,q)∈S
P((e, q), S) · q =
∑
(e,q)∈greedyM′ (R∪S,L)
q =
∑
e∈greedyM (R∪B,L
∗)
p(e)
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and is thus equal to the revenue resulting from price function p. This shows that the optimal
revenue achievable on the assortment problem is least that achievable on the Stackelberg
Matroid instance, as desired. 
Next we provide a proof of Theorem 5.1. In order to do so, we need to introduce some
definitions and a lemma.
Given δ ∈ R such that rk + δ > 0, we define L
∗(δ) to be the set of indices ℓ ∈ [k] with the
property that, if we add δ to the revenue of all items, then choosing all items of revenue at least
rℓ + δ gives an optimal revenue-ordered assortment (w.r.t. the modified revenue function) for
the usual assortment problem. (Note that whenever the revenue of an item becomes negative,
the item will never be chosen by the revenue ordered assortment strategy.) That is, L∗(δ) is
the set of indices ℓ ∈ [k] such that
j(ℓ)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ)})(r(x) + δ) = max
ℓ′∈[k]
j(ℓ′)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ′)})(r(x) + δ).
Lemma .1. Let δ1, δ2 ∈ R with δ1 + rk > 0 and δ1 6 δ2. Then, minL
∗(δ2) 6 minL
∗(δ1).
Proof. Let ℓ1 := minL
∗(δ1), ℓ2 := minL
∗(δ2) and ∆ := δ2 − δ1 > 0. For the purpose of
contradiction, suppose that ℓ2 > ℓ1. This means that j(ℓ2) < j(ℓ1) since products in C are
enumerated in decreasing order of revenue.
We will show that if we add δ2 to the revenue of all items (w.r.t. revenue function r), the
expected revenue resulting from the assortment {1, . . . , j(ℓ2)} is at most that of the assortment
{1, . . . , j(ℓ1)}. This implies ℓ2 6 ℓ1, a contradiction.
We have
j(ℓ2)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ2)})(r(x) + δ2)
=
j(ℓ2)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ2)})(r(x) + δ1) + ∆
j(ℓ2)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ2)})
6
j(ℓ1)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ1)})(r(x) + δ1) + ∆
j(ℓ2)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ2)})
6
j(ℓ1)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ1)})(r(x) + δ1) + ∆
j(ℓ1)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ1)})
=
j(ℓ1)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ1)})(r(x) + δ2)
The first inequality holds because {1, . . . , j(ℓ1)}, by definition, yields the highest expected rev-
enue among all revenue-ordered assortments when δ1 is added to the revenue of each item. The
second inequality follows from Lemma 2.1 and the assumption that ℓ2 > ℓ1. This concludes
the proof. 
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Proof of Theorem 5.1. We begin by proving that ℓ∗t (q) 6 ℓ
∗
t (q − 1) if q > 2. For t
′ > 0 and
q′ > 1 let
∆Jt′(q
′) := Jt′(q
′)− Jt′(q
′ − 1),
that is, ∆Jt′(q
′) is the marginal value of the capacity when there are t′ time periods remaining.
(Let us point out that ∆Jt′(q
′) = Jt′(q
′) = Jt′(q
′ − 1) = 0 if t′ = 0.)
We can express Jt(q) as follows:
Jt(q) = max
ℓ∈[k]


j(ℓ)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ)})(r(x) + Jt−1(q − 1)) + P(0, {1, . . . , j(ℓ)})Jt−1(q)


= max
ℓ∈[k]


j(ℓ)∑
x=1
P(x, {1, . . . , j(ℓ)})(r(x) −∆Jt−1(q))}+ Jt−1(q)

 (16)
Observe that
ℓ∗t (q − 1) = minL
∗(−∆Jt−1(q − 1)). (17)
In other words, ℓ∗t (q − 1) is the largest revenue ordered assortment which is optimal when
∆Jt−1(q − 1) is subtracted from the revenue of each item. Since the most revenue one could
obtain from an extra unit of capacity is the revenue of the most expensive product (i.e. rk),
we have that rk −∆Jt−1(q − 1) > 0 as needed.
Suppose that we subtract ∆Jt−1(q) to the original revenue of each item. By Equation (16)
we know that
ℓ∗t (q) = minL
∗(−∆Jt−1(q)) (18)
Again, since the most revenue one could obtain from an extra unit of capacity is the revenue
of the most expensive product (i.e. rk), we have that rk −∆Jt−1(q) > 0 as desired.
Talluri and Van Ryzin [44, Lemma 4] proved that ∆Jt−1(q − 1) > ∆Jt−1(q) always holds,
regardless of the discrete choice model under consideration (that is, the three axioms (i), (ii)
and (iii) are enough for this property to hold). Therefore, by Lemma .1, we have that
minL∗(−∆Jt−1(q − 1)) > minL
∗(−∆Jt−1(q)) (19)
Combining (18), (19) and (17) we have that
ℓ∗t (q) = minL
∗(−∆Jt−1(q)) 6 minL
∗(−∆Jt−1(q − 1)) = ℓ
∗
t (q − 1)
as desired.
We now proceed to prove that ℓ∗t (q) is non-increasing in t, which carries on in a similar way.
Suppose that we subtract ∆Jt−2(q) to the original revenue of each item. By equation (16) we
know that
ℓ∗t−1(q) = minL
∗(−∆Jt−2(q)) (20)
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Again, since the most revenue one could obtain from an extra unit of capacity is the revenue
of the most expensive product (i.e. rk), we have that rk −∆Jt−2(q) > 0 as desired.
Talluri and Van Ryzin [44, Lemma 5] proved that ∆Jt−1(q) > ∆Jt−2(q) always holds, re-
gardless of the discrete choice model under consideration. Therefore, by Lemma .1, we have
that
minL∗(−∆Jt−2(q)) 6 minL
∗(−∆Jt−1(q)) (21)
Combining (20), (21) and (18) we have that
ℓ∗t−1(q) = minL
∗(−∆Jt−2(q)) 6 minL
∗(−∆Jt−1(q)) = ℓ
∗
t (q)
as desired. 
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